The world since September 11th
IT STANDS to reason that 19 men cannot change history. But they did. Five years and two American-led wars later, the world created by the September 11th hijackers is a darker place than almost anyone predicted at the start of the new century. Al-Qaeda itself may have been battered and dispersed, but the idea it stands for has spread its poison far and wide.
The essence of that idea, so far as a coherent one can be distilled from the ferment of broadcasts and fat was issued by Osama bin Laden and his disciples, is that Islam is everywhere under attack by the infidel and that every Muslim has a duty to wage holy war, jihad, in its defence. America is deemed a special target for having trespassed on the Arab heartland. Intoxicated by their defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the jihadists are hungry to topple another superpower.
This cause had deadly adherents before the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre in 2001. Mr bin Laden issued his “Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders” in 1998, the year al-Qaeda bombed two American embassies in East Africa. But an honest tally of the record since September 11th has to conclude that the number of jihadists and their sympathisers has probably multiplied many times since then. It has multiplied, moreover, partly as a result of the way America responded.
The first of the two wars George Bush launched after September 11th looked initially like a success, and compared with the second it still is. Al-Qaeda operated openly in Afghanistan and enjoyed the protection of its noxious Taliban regime, which refused America’s request to hand Mr bin Laden over. America’s invasion, one month after America itself had been attacked, therefore enjoyed broad international support.
The fighting ended swiftly and the political aftermath went as well as could be expected in a polity as tangled as Afghanistan’s. By 2004 a firstever free election had legitimated the presidency of Hamid Karzai. A ramshackle but representative parliament took office in 2005. The country is plagued by warlordism and the opium trade, and Taliban fighters are mounting a challenge in the south. But they do not yet look capable of dislodging the new government in Kabul.
Even though Mr bin Laden himself eluded America’s forces in Afghanistan, the invasion deprived al-Qaeda of a haven for planning and training. This achievement, however, was cancelled out by the consequences of Mr Bush’s second war: the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. There, three and a half years on, fighting and terrorism kill hundreds every month, providing the jihadists with both a banner around which to recruit and a live arena in which to sharpen their military skills.
Why has Iraq turned out so much worse than Afghanistan? Not only because of the familiar catalogue of Rumsfeldian incompetence—disbanding Iraq’s army, committing too few American troops—but also because of al-Qaeda itself. Like most Sunni extremists, some in al-Qaeda regard Shia Muslims as virtual apostates. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the movement’s leader in Iraq, managed before being killed last June to organise so many attacks on Shias and their holy places that after a long forbearance the Shias at last struck back, turning what had been an insurgency against the Americans and the new government into a bitter sectarian war.
考研詞匯：
essence[ˈesəns]
n.本質，實質
[真題例句] The resulting discontent may in (32：turn) lead more youths into criminal behavior.[2004年完形]
(32) [A] case[B] short
[C] turn[D] essence
[例句精譯] 這種招人不滿的結果反過來會使更多的年輕人卷入犯罪行為。
(32)[A] (in ～)如果[B] (in ～)總之[C] (in ～)輪流;反過來[D] (in ～)本質上
coherent[kəuˈhiərənt]
a.粘著的，粘附的
invasion[inˈveiʒən]
n.侵入，侵略 [真題例句] Countries that still think foreign investment is an invasion of their sovereignty might well study the history of infrastructure (the basic structural foundations of a society) in the United States.[2001年閱讀2]
[例句精譯] 那些認為外國投資是對本國主權的侵犯的國家最好還是研究一下美國的基礎設施(社會的基本結構基礎)建設歷史。
swift[swift]
a.快速的，敏捷的
legitimate[liˈdʒitimit]
a.合法的，合理的，正統(tǒng)的;v.合法
[真題例句] George Annas, chair of the health law department at Boston University, maintains that, as long as a doctor prescribes a drug for a legitimate (a.) medical purpose, the doctor has done nothing illegal even if the patient uses the drug to hasten death.[2002年閱讀4]
[例句精譯] 波士頓大學健康法律系主任喬治·安納斯堅持認為，只要醫(yī)生是出于合理的醫(yī)療目的開藥，那么即使服用此藥會加速病人的死亡，醫(yī)生的行為也沒有違法。
plague[pleig]
n.瘟疫，災害
[真題例句] Often they choose—and still are choosing—somewhat colder climates such as Oregon, Idaho and Alaska in order to escape smog, crime and other plagues of urbanization in the Golden State.[1998年閱讀4]
[例句精譯] 他們常常選擇——現在依然這樣選擇——一些氣候較冷的地區(qū)，如俄勒岡、愛達荷和阿拉斯加，為的是躲開這個黃金州(加利福尼亞)的煙霧、犯罪和其他城市化進程中的問題。
背景常識介紹：
2001年9月11日美國四架民航客機遭恐怖分子劫持，其中兩架撞向紐約世貿大樓，一架撞擊在華盛頓五角大樓，另一架墜毀。這是人類有史以來首次利用民航客機制造恐怖事件，也是有史以來最嚴重的一次恐怖襲擊事件。那么究竟是誰制造了這次恐怖襲擊事件呢?
參考譯文：
9·11之后的世界
人們有理由相信19個人無法改變歷史，但這些人確實做到了。5年來,在美國挑起的兩次戰(zhàn)爭之后,世界形勢在經歷了9·11撞擊后比本世紀初幾乎任何人預料到的都要糟�；亟M織本身也許已經被摧毀,但它所代表的思想意識毒害散播的范圍要廣的多。
這種思想意識可以從目前躁動的廣播和本·拉登及其信徒們的指示中清楚地提煉出來其思想本質,那就是伊斯蘭正經受著來自各處的異教徒的進攻,因此每一個穆斯林都有義務開展圣戰(zhàn)進行自衛(wèi)。美國被認為是一個擅自闖入阿拉伯中心區(qū)域的特殊目標。由于依然陶醉于80年代在阿富汗擊敗前蘇聯(lián)的勝利之中,圣戰(zhàn)徒們急于推翻另一超級大國。
此想法在2001年撞擊五角大樓和世貿中心前有亡命之徒般的追隨者。1998年基地組織在東非炸毀兩座美國大使館,同年,本·拉登發(fā)表了“呼吁全世界伊斯蘭站在抗爭猶太人和歐美人圣戰(zhàn)前線的宣言”。但真實的情況是,自9·11以來,圣戰(zhàn)徒及其支持者的人數恐怕已經翻了幾番,而且此人數的增長與美國的回應有關。
在9·11后布什發(fā)動的兩次戰(zhàn)爭中,前者初期看起來較為成功,相比于后者仍不算失敗。惡名昭著的塔利班政權拒絕向美國交出本·拉登�；亟M織在其保護下公開地在阿富汗運作。因此美國遭受襲擊一個月后入侵阿富汗,也贏得了廣泛的國際支持。
戰(zhàn)爭迅速結束,戰(zhàn)后政治進程也與人們料想到的能在政體紊亂的阿富汗所進行的一樣順利。到2004年已由首次自由選舉選出了卡爾扎依總統(tǒng)。一屆搖搖欲墜卻有代表性的議會2005年正式成立。雖然阿富汗現今充斥著軍閥勢力和鴉片貿易,塔利班還在南方展開了抵抗,但他們看起來還不具備將新政府趕出首都喀布爾的能力。
盡管本·拉登本人逃離了駐阿富汗美軍的打擊,但阿富汗戰(zhàn)爭的確使基地組織失去了組織計劃與訓練的場所�？墒�,這一成果被布什發(fā)動的第二場戰(zhàn)爭——2003年3月入侵伊拉克——所產生的后果給抵消了。伊拉克三年半以來,戰(zhàn)斗和恐怖主義每月導致數百人喪生。這既給圣戰(zhàn)徒們提供了招募新兵的幌子,又提供了能夠提高武裝力量的鮮活的訓練基地。
為什么伊拉克的結局比阿富汗糟糕呢?不僅僅有像國防部長拉姆斯菲爾德的無能所導致的一連串失誤——解散伊拉克軍隊，派遣過少的美軍士兵——還由于基地組織本身。像大部分遜尼派極端分子一樣，一些基地組織成員視什葉派穆斯林為宗教叛徒。該運動領導人Abu Musab alZarqawi在去年6月被殺前,多次成功地擊敗針對什葉派和圣城的襲擊。在長時間忍讓之后,什葉派也最終開始反擊,將本已嚴峻的伊拉克形勢從經常性地向美軍與新政府進行攻擊拖入了更深的宗教派別戰(zhàn)爭的泥潭�！� |
